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Fulford’s and Stanghellini’s (2008) concise 
and rich article is a mission-statement of an in-
ﬂ  uential direction in what they call the “third 
revolution” in late twentieth-century psychiatry. 
Values-based practice ﬁ  nds its intellectual moor-
ing in phenomenology and analytic philosophy 
and is geared to handle the “complex and con-
ﬂ   icting values” that are part of clinical deci-
sion-making. The authors present values-based 
practice as a complement to the neurosciences 
(concerned with establishing diagnostic facts), 
and patient-guided, multidisciplinary organised 
practice (a reminder of just who philosophy and 
science are in service to: patients).   
The essence of clinical practice thus con-
ceived seems a world away from the rule-of-ex-
perts characteristic of pre-revolution psychiatry 
in the United Kingdom, for example, and current 
psychiatric practice in many parts of the world. 
In this dialogue I will be referring to Egypt. This 
new vision of clinical practice undermines the 
power previously reserved to the experts, by 
whom I mean the clinicians who held within 
their practice all the available facts, all the rele-
vant values, and who worked with objective and 
non-negotiable frameworks and systems. Now 
this power has been seriously diluted by values-
based practice and tempered by patient-guided 
practice and multidisciplinary teams. 
Values-based practice endorses democratic 
values and a pluralistic orientation, both suited 
to multicultural societies where the prolifera-
tion of identities and values precludes assump-
tions of basic values and core identities, regard-
less of political rhetoric. It requires a degree of 
moral relativism and a temporary suspension of 
assumptions and judgements. There are two re-
lated implications of values-based practice that 
I would like to raise: (1) an essential ambiguity 
seems to arise: in place of unquestionable diag-
nostic certainty we ﬁ  nd dialogue, communica-
tion, and a quest for agreement; prerequisites for 
delivery of acceptable health-care. (2) Rule-of-
experts is undermined.
The value of this in a pluralist, multicultural 
society is obvious. Here I want to ask: are these 
changes necessarily positive in cultural contexts 
where different orientations to authority and 
knowledge exist? Rule-of-experts is very much 
a reality in medical practice in Egypt. The ques-
tion is not how we could change that but whether 
it is advisable. Changing it will have implica-
tions on the very meaning of “treatment”, “con-
sultation” and the very idea of seeing a doctor. 
Medical authority in Egypt is absolute and medi-
cal knowledge, owing primarily to illiteracy and 
absence of interest, continues to seem esoteric. 
In this context I note, and this is evidence drawn 
from my own work and research in Egypt, that 
patients rarely appreciate the chance to be in-
volved in health-care decisions; they are not 
willing to tolerate ambiguity. They tend to see 
this as a sign that the doctor perhaps is not an 
expert, after all why would a good doctor ask his 
patient what her view of her predicament is (why 
is this relevant?) and what treatment she wants 
(shouldn’t the doctor know better?). 
Conﬂ  icts of values are not visible, since the 
values brought to the fore by the expert are the 
only relevant ones, and this is frequently the pa-
tient’s view. Psychiatric assessments take on an 
extreme medical form, with symptom checklists 
followed by an extensive prescription. It is quite 
common for a patient to be brought to the psy-
chiatrist by a family member who reports a few 
symptoms on their behalf, keen to be handed a 
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prescription and get on their way. In my experi-
ence patients found it strange that I wanted to 
spend an hour with them, asking them about their 
views and their family’s. This of course points to 
a different conception of psychiatry and mental 
illness, and different power hierarchies within 
the family, but the main point holds: rule-of-ex-
perts is the norm in healthcare, and patients seem 
to be adapted to this, in fact recognise this as a 
sign of a “good doctor” and a decent consulta-
tion. 
To conclude I would tentatively like to raise 
the idea that values-based practice is a philo-
sophically inspired methodological approach to 
clinical assessment that suits particular societies 
but not necessarily others. I must admit here that 
I personally and as a clinician believe that to set 
the clinical encounter on the right foot values-
based practice is of utmost importance. Howev-
er, as I learnt from exposure to different cultural 
contexts, what constitutes the “right foot” varies 
widely.
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